Journal impact factors and self-citations: Implications for psychology journals by Anseel, Frederik et al.
agree that it is a misinterpretation of the
Steele and Aronson (1995) results to con-
clude that eliminating stereotype threat
eliminates the African American–White
test-score gap. They agree that we have iden-
tified multiple mischaracterizations of their
work in media reports, journal articles, and
textbooks, which wrongly interpret their
work as finding that eliminating stereotype
threat did indeed eliminate the score gap.
They agree that these mischaracterizations
are regrettable.
However, Steele and Aronson (2004)
assert that there is no need to worry about
mischaracterizations of their findings in the
absence of evidence that these mischaracter-
izations have led to widespread misunder-
standing of the role stereotype threat plays in
explaining the African American–White test-
score gap. We disagree. Although evidence
of such misunderstanding would certainly be
grave cause for concern, we believe it is
sufficiently worrisome when one of the sem-
inal studies on stereotype threat is commonly
wrongly interpreted—by the popular media,
textbook publishers, and academics alike—to
mean that the African American–White test-
score gap disappears when stereotype threat
is eliminated. Steele and Aronson assert that
their 1995 study is “a drop in an ocean of
information about the race gap” (Steele &
Aronson, 2004, p. 47). We believe they are
unduly modest about the impact of their pa-
per; that the Social Sciences Citation Index
reports that it has been cited more than 300
times is one indicator of its prominence.
Steele and Aronson (2004) assert that
because there are now over 100 research
studies on stereotype threat, our focus on
the first article on the topic results in a
serious bias. However, they later acknowl-
edge that their article is one of few stereo-
type threat studies focusing on African
Americans. As the African American–
White score gap was the topic of our arti-
cle, we see our focus on this pivotal and
highly cited article as entirely appropriate.
Steele and Aronson (2004) also assert
that no attentive reader of the literature on
the race gap would conclude that stereo-
type threat is its sole cause. However, our
concern is with broader audiences than the
serious scholar working on issues of race.
We are concerned about students who are
being initially exposed to issues of psycho-
logical testing and the race gap in their
introductory psychology courses. We are
concerned about managers responsible for
personnel selection systems in their orga-
nizations. We are concerned about psy-
chologists who do not follow testing issues
closely and whose only exposure to stereo-
type threat may be through an American
Psychological Association Monitor on Psy-
chology column making the interpretive er-
ror that is the focus of our article. We are
concerned about the large audience watch-
ing Frontline and hearing that the score gap
is eliminated in the no-threat condition.
Steele and Aronson (2004) address the
use of a prior SAT score as a covariate,
claiming that we overworried about readers
being misled by this analysis. They argue that
a larger literature shows the stereotype threat
effect, sometimes with the use of a prior test
as a covariate and sometimes without. How-
ever, in our article, we noted clearly that we
are not questioning the finding of a stereotype
threat effect (i.e., the finding of a Race 
Diagnostic Condition interaction) in Steele
and Aronson (1995). Our concern is with
misinterpreting the graphical presentation of
findings as suggesting that group differences
can be eliminated.
Steele and Aronson (2004) take issue
with our comparison of African American–
White differences on the prior SAT and on
GRE-based scores in the two experimental
conditions. Steele and Aronson assert that
these are not comparable because the pretest
SAT and the experimental GRE-based test
are not perfectly correlated and because N is
small. Given the extensive data on the simi-
larity of the score gaps between the two tests
and the correlation between the two, we see it
as reasonable to posit that two groups that do
not differ on the SAT would also be expected
not to differ on the GRE.
We share with Steele and Aronson the
beliefs that single experiments do not an-
swer all questions and that it is important to
examine the role of stereotype threat in
real-life testing settings. We certainly agree
with their position that evolving literatures
have self-correcting capacities, and we
view our article as fulfilling exactly such a
role. Most crucially, we note that the dis-
agreement between us is about the conse-
quences of the mischaracterization we doc-
umented, not about whether the work has
been mischaracterized.
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Recently, Adair and Vohra (January 2003)
analyzed changes in the number of refer-
ences and citations in psychology journals
as a consequence of the current knowledge
explosion. In their study, the authors made
a striking observation of the sometimes ex-
cessive number of self-citations in psychol-
ogy journals. However, after this illustra-
tion, no further attention was paid to the
issue of self-citation. This is unfortunate
because little is known about self-citing
practices in psychology. Early research on
self-citations in psychology journals indi-
cated that about 10% of citations were self-
citations, and one author concluded that “it
is apparent that controlling for self-citation
is not necessary” (Gottfredson, 1978, p.
932). Similarly, although the Publication
Manual of the American Psychological As-
sociation (American Psychological Associ-
ation, 2001) provides clear guidelines on
the form citations should take, it does not
indicate when it is appropriate to cite one’s
own work.
Recent figures urge more caution
when dealing with self-citations. A multi-
disciplinary study found that 36% of all
citations represent author self-citations
(Aksnes, 2003; see also McGarty, 2000, for
a similar finding in social psychology). Es-
pecially troublesome is the finding that
self-citations peak during the first three
years after publication, thereby strongly in-
fluencing impact factors of journals that are
based on two-year periods.
Although the use of citation counts
(and impact factors) has been criticized in
all disciplines (see, e.g., Boor, 1982), it has
become the main quantitative measure of
the quality of a journal. Accordingly, these
figures are used to make decisions about
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journal subscriptions, selection of journals
for paper submission, rankings of authors,
author tenure, individual grants, and even
funding of entire research groups and insti-
tutions, insofar that researchers have ex-
pressed their concern about the current ob-
session of the academic world with impact
factors (Lawrence, 2003).
Therefore, an important underex-
plored question is to what extent impact
factors of psychology journals are artifi-
cially inflated or deflated by self-citations.
There are good reasons to expect more
self-citations from authors publishing in
high-impact journals (e.g., Psychological
Bulletin) than from authors publishing in
low-impact journals (e.g., Computers in
Human Behavior). This is because the
former authors in general are more experi-
enced and more successful. In addition,
they are often part of a larger research
group, so that they can coauthor more ar-
ticles. For example, researchers who pub-
lished in Psychological Bulletin during
1998–1999 had on average 2.83 publica-
tions in 2000, in comparison with 0.96
publications for authors who published in
Computers in Human Behavior. As a con-
sequence, these researchers have more op-
portunities to cite their own work. The
main question, however, is whether this
difference in self-citation rate is strong
enough to affect the journal impact scores:
Do journals with high citation counts get an
extra “citation boost” due to self-citations?
We used the Institute for Scientific
Information (ISI) databases Web of Sci-
ence (WoS) and Journal Citation Reports
(JCR) as the basis of our analyses. From
each article (including empirical articles
and literature reviews) in five high-, five
middle-, and five low-ranked journals in
psychology published in 1998 and 1999,
we collected the number of self-citations
and other-citations in 2000 from the WoS.
All journals were included in either the
psychology or psychology, experimental
subsection of the JCR Social Science Edi-
tion 2000. Self-citations were assessed us-
ing the criterion that at least one author
(first or coauthor) was also an author (first
or coauthor) of the citing paper. On the
basis of these data, we recalculated the
impact factor for each journal with and
without self-citations. As can be seen in
Table 1, small discrepancies between the
official impact factors (ISI) and our own
calculations appeared. These discrepancies
are caused by inaccuracies in the ISI data-
bases and have been reported before (“Er-
rors in Citation Statistics,” 2002).
We found that articles in high-impact
journals received more (M  0.91) self-
citations than articles in middle- (M 
0.44) and low-impact journals (M  0.11),
thus confirming our expectation that au-
thors publishing in high-impact journals
have more opportunities to cite their own
work. To test whether these differences in
numbers of self-citations change the differ-
ences in journal impact factors, we calcu-
lated the ratio of self-citations to the total
number of citations for each article that
received citations in 2000. A one-way anal-
ysis of variance was calculated with this
ratio as a dependent variable and impact
factor group (high, middle, low) as the in-
dependent variable. There was a significant
effect of impact factor group, F(2, 650) 
17.43, p  .001, 2  .05. Tukey’s post
hoc analyses revealed that the high-impact
factor group (M  .20, SD  .02) had a
significantly lower ratio of self-citations to
total citations, p  .01, than the other two
groups, which did not differ from each
other, p  .85 (low group M  .39, SD 
.05; middle group M  .36, SD  .02). So,
contrary to our expectations, the ratio of
self-citations to total citations in high-
impact journals was about half that of low-
impact journals.
This is good news for the high-impact
psychology journals: Compared with low-
and middle-impact journals, their true cita-
tion counts are actually underestimated.
When we adjusted our calculated impact
factors for self-citations (see the last
column of Table 1), we found that high-
impact journals dropped on average by
Table 1
Citations, Self-Citations, and Different Impact Factors for Selected Psychology Journals
Impact factor group & journal
ISI impact
factor
No.
cited
2000
No.
self-citations
2000
No. articles
1998–1999
Computed
impact
factor
Adjusted
impact
factor
Low-impact factor group
Psychology 0.16 (15) 3 3 44 0.07 (15) 0.00 (15)
Journal of Economic Psychology 0.25 (14) 10 3 61 0.16 (14) 0.11 (13)
American Journal of Psychology 0.29 (13) 13 5 49 0.27 (13) 0.16 (12)
Computers in Human Behavior 0.33 (12) 41 11 78 0.53 (11) 0.38 (11)
Psychologica Belgica 0.42 (11) 8 6 25 0.32 (12) 0.08 (14)
Middle-impact factor group
Animal Learning and Behavior 1.11 (10) 92 39 86 1.07 (10) 0.62 (10)
Journal of Motor Behavior 1.14 (9) 80 37 65 1.23 (7) 0.66 (9)
Acta Psychologica 1.27 (8) 120 35 101 1.19 (9) 0.84 (8)
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 1.28 (7) 107 30 87 1.23 (8) 0.89 (7)
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 1.37 (6) 131 40 74 1.77 (6) 1.23 (6)
High-impact factor group
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 5.12 (5) 520 133 104 5.00 (5) 3.72 (5)
Annual Review of Psychology 5.85 (4) 272 26 47 5.79 (4) 5.23 (3)
Psychological Review 6.07 (3) 426 84 72 5.92 (3) 4.75 (4)
American Psychologist 6.86 (2) 740 60 119 6.22 (2) 5.71 (1)
Psychological Bulletin 6.91 (1) 459 69 69 6.65 (1) 5.65 (2)
Note. Journal rankings are reported in parentheses. ISI  Institute for Scientific Information.
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15%, whereas middle- and low-impact
journals dropped by 35% and 45%, respec-
tively. As can be seen in Table 1, adjusting
for self-citations also produced changes in
journal rankings. For instance, adjusted im-
pact factors indicate that the American Psy-
chologist takes over the place of Psycho-
logical Bulletin as the most cited journal in
psychology.
However, the good news for the high-
impact journals should not make one forget
that the journal impact scores are to a large
extent determined by self-citations. This is
problematic when the impact factors are
used as measures of journal quality. A first
way to improve the situation would be for
editors and reviewers to keep the number
of self-citations within limits. Editors al-
ready have expressed concern about the
rising number of references and citations in
psychology journals (Adair & Vohra,
2003), so a self-citing restriction would
probably be welcomed. Unfortunately, the
implementation of such a restriction may
be difficult to achieve because it is not easy
to determine where the border is between
gratuitous self-citations and self-citations
as a consequence of the cumulative nature
of one’s research. A second, more plausible
solution is to compute impact factors ad-
justed for self-citations, as we did in this
study. This procedure can be defended on
the basis of the observation that self-
citations do not reveal much about the im-
pact of an article in the wider scientific
community (Aksnes, 2003). A third possi-
bility is to use longer citation windows
(e.g., five years) when calculating impact
factors. This is known to reduce the
proportion of self-citations (Moed, van
Leeuwen, & Reedijk, 1999).
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On (Not) Trimming One’s
Toenails With a Bazooka
Christopher D. Green
York University
Adair and Vohra (January 2003) showed
that the number of references used in psy-
chological articles has increased over the
past few decades. This increase constituted
such a crisis in their view that they advised
psychologists to cut back on the number of
references they use as a way of responding
to the information explosion.
From my perspective, however, there
is no crisis. First, a simple plot of the
information pertaining to the four psychol-
ogy journals given in their Table 1 (Adair
& Vohra, 2003, p. 17) shows the increase
to have been linear over the past three
decades, not explosive, as they claimed.
Second, for many of us who have
grown up in the information age, the
amount of material to which we have ready
access does not constitute a crisis but a
bounty. To be sure, navigation can be dif-
ficult at times, but electronic technologies
are making it easier by the day.
Third, what exactly is the cost of ad-
ditional references? Surely it does not con-
stitute an academic, intellectual, or schol-
arly crisis. Adair and Vohra (2003)
attempted to buttress their argument with a
comparison of the increase in references
used in psychology articles to that of those
used in physics, but surely we psycholo-
gists are now beyond the stage where we
measure our progress by how faithfully we
ape physicists. Every discipline develops
its own scholarly culture over time. In psy-
chology, we use more references than in
physics. Why? Perhaps because we have
more respect for our history. Perhaps, by
contrast, because we cannot assume that
our colleagues know their disciplinary his-
tory as well as physicists do. Perhaps be-
cause we have more competing theoretical
strands running side by side. Perhaps be-
cause we just like it that way.
In point of fact, given that additional
references can only be advantageous to the
reader, the only party that could legiti-
mately object to them would be the pub-
lisher, who must set and print extra pages
to accommodate them. I am tempted to
dismiss this as irrelevant. Publishers should
not trump matters of intellectual quality
with economic concerns—if they try to, we
should get different publishers (or abandon
them in favor of the Internet, but that is
another argument). Even if we accept this
problem as legitimate, it can be dealt with
in ways much less drastic than demanding
that reference lists be cut: Smaller fonts,
standard abbreviations for commonly used
journal titles, truncated article titles, and
the like would all shrink the physical size
of reference lists without actually deleting
items.
Even more important, however, is that
we should abandon the lingering Gutenberg-
era assumptions that permeate Adair and
Vohra’s (2003) article. None of their wor-
ries will matter one whit once psycholo-
gists move into the era of electronic schol-
arly publication. References will no longer
take up literal page space but occupy only
a few hundred extra bytes in a digital file. If
the user chooses not to print the references
to save paper, so be it. Stevan Harnad has
shown psychologists the way of the prob-
able future (indeed, the way of the present
in physics) with his electronic journal Psy-
coloquy, with his e-print archive Cog-
Prints, and with his many articles and ad-
dresses on the topic of electronic scholarly
publication.
Whatever else, let us not take drastic
measures to resolve a matter that is prob-
lematic only for an antiquated technology
that we are now (gradually) in the process
of abandoning.
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